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Abstract
Using a large panel of unquoted euro-area ﬁrms over the period 2003-11, this paper
examines the impact of ﬁnancial pressure on ﬁrms’ employment. The analysis ﬁnds
evidence that ﬁnancial pressure negatively aﬀects ﬁrms’ employment decisions. This
eﬀect is stronger during the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis, especially for ﬁrms in the periph-
ery area compared to their counterparts in the core European economies. We also ﬁnd
that impact of ﬁnancial pressure on employment is more potent for ﬁrms classiﬁed as
ﬁnancially constrained and operating in periphery economies during the ﬁnancial crisis.
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1 Introduction
The magnitude of the global ﬁnancial crisis that commenced in late 2007 was exceptional
when compared to previous recent episodes of ﬁnancial distress. At its core, it was a bank-
ing crisis highlighting the important links between ﬁnancial conditions and the real economy
(Iyer et al. (2014)). In the euro area, following a period of convergence prior to the crisis, ﬁ-
nancial market fragmentation intensiﬁed and periphery-based ﬁrms, especially smaller ones,
faced major problems in accessing external ﬁnance. This has important economic implica-
tions since the weight of smaller ﬁrms in the European economy is considerable, with Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) contributing around 60% of the value added and 70% of
employment (Artola and Genre (2011)). In a recent speech, Draghi (2014) highlighted the
negative eﬀects of ﬁnancial fragmentation, pointing out that euro area credit conditions re-
main very heterogeneous, with credit weakness contributing to economic weakness in the
stressed countries. Furthermore, it has been argued that the high prevalence SMEs in the
periphery economies rendered them vulnerable to the tightening of credit during the ﬁnancial
crisis and is crucial for the slow pace of economic recovery (Klein (2014)). Consequently, an
intense debate has developed regarding the appropriate policy measures to be adopted by
the European Central Bank (ECB) to restore the ﬂow of credit to ﬁnancially fragile ﬁrms in
the periphery.1
As Campello et al. (2011) point out, while unfortunate, the crisis provides academics and
policymakers with a unique opportunity to get important insights on ﬁrm behaviour. This
draws upon a rich existing literature since the examination of the impact of ﬁnancial market
imperfections on ﬁrms’ real decisions has been at the top of the research agenda for quite
sometime. Since the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988), who provided evidence that ﬁrms
which are more likely to face ﬁnancial constraints display a high sensitivity of investment to
1In line with the "funding for lending" policy, on 5 June 2014 the ECB conﬁrmed its commitment to lend
to euro area banks up to e400 billion with the main condition being that they should improve their record
in lending to private ﬁrms and households. Nevertheless, doubts exist regarding the potential of "funding
for lending" to release suﬃcient funds for the pressured SMEs in periphery (Klein (2014)).
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cash ﬂow, several pre-crisis studies have highlighted the importance of ﬁnancing constraints
on ﬁrms’ real behavior such as ﬁxed investment, inventory investment, employment and R&D
activities (see Hubbard (1998) for a survey). Motivated by the crisis, a number of recent
studies re-examined the impact of ﬁnancial factors on ﬁrm investment behavior, commonly
identifying a strong eﬀect for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, especially for the US (see e.g.
Campello et al. (2010) and Duchin et al. (2010)).2 Considerably less in known, however,
about the role of ﬁnancial pressure during the recent crisis. The few studies that consider
the above link are Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and Hernando (2008), who ﬁnd
a strong and negative relationship between employment and ﬁnancial pressure. Yet, these
studies do not extend to the recent ﬁnancial crisis and use single-country data-sets which
makes it diﬃcult to draw conclusions about the euro area as a whole, or to obtain crisp
comparisons on the experience of periphery versus non-periphery countries.
Our study attempts to ﬁll this gap by examining the impact of ﬁnancial pressure on em-
ployment using a comprehensive panel of euro area ﬁrm-level data, the majority of which are
unquoted. We capture ﬁnancial pressure using a ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate variable, namely
the interest burden. Our analysis will shed light on the stability of the link between euro
area employment and ﬁnancial pressure, accounting at the same time for possible diﬀerences
between core and periphery economies. In other words, we will examine whether the impact
of ﬁnancial pressure on employment has strengthened during the ﬁnancial crisis and whether
it is more pronounced in the periphery of the euro area. Furthermore, we will investigate
whether the link is stronger for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms and SMEs. Such evidence is im-
portant for understanding the mechanism through which ﬁnancing constraints aﬀect ﬁrms’
employment and can be used to better inform euro area policy makers and ﬁrm managers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 presents an overview of
the related literature. Sections 3 and 4 contain our methodology and data-set description,
respectively. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while Section 6 explains the robustness
2Other prominent studies that focus on the link between ﬁnancial constraints and employment in the US
include Duygan-Bump et al. (2010) and Chodorow-Reich (2014).
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checks that we undertook. Section 7 provides conclusions and policy implications.
2 Related literature
Most models of ﬁrm ﬁnance assume that ﬁrms require some external ﬁnance, from either
banks or ﬁnancial markets, to pursue investment projects and that is available subject to
minimum standards of creditworthiness in the eyes of the lender. If creditworthiness grows
with size and age then this might suggest that there is simply a life-cycle eﬀect that inﬂu-
ences a ﬁrm’s decision to access external ﬁnance, and if this were the case, in an asymmetric
information world, net worth would be an important determinant of that decision. The path-
breaking empirical work of Fazzari et al. (1988) suggests that corporate ﬁnancial decisions
will be aﬀected by constraints arising from the availability and cost of external ﬁnance to
ﬁrms, and will diﬀer in relation to the observable characteristics used by lenders to deter-
mine their creditworthiness. The degree of ﬁnancial constraints faced by ﬁrms is a critical
determinant of real responses to ﬁnancial market imperfections.
The literature on the relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and employment is not
as voluminous as that on investment, but the general consensus that emerges is that ﬁ-
nancial constraints can play an important role in ﬁrm-level employment decisions. As
Benmelech et al. (2011) point out, theoretically, the cost and availability of external ﬁnance
may aﬀect ﬁrm-level employment both directly and indirectly through a number of channels.
A direct eﬀect can arise in the presence of a mismatch between labour payments and cash
ﬂow generation that induces ﬁrms to ﬁnance labour activity throughout production. Hence,
a negative shock in the capacity to ﬁnance working capital should lead to lower employment.3
An indirect eﬀect can arise through investment. Capital market imperfections imply that
internal funds’ availability places constraints on investment, and given labour-capital com-
3Chodorow-Reich (2014) also argues that for ﬁrms that use working capital to ﬁnance labour or other
production inputs, an increase in the interest cost of borrowing operates like a cost-push shock implying
lower output and labour demand. At the limit, ﬁrms may give up working capital and ﬁnance production
out of retained earnings only or may be subject to credit rationing.
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plementarity, employment should decline in line with the fall in capital. In the theoretical
work of Arnold (2002), the combination of uncertain proﬁts and ﬁxed future debt payments
implies that ﬁrms face the risk of ﬁnancial distress. His model implies that ﬁrms’ labour
demand will ﬂuctuate in response to changes in their balance-sheet position, with weaker
ﬁnancial position being associated with lower demand due to higher risk of future ﬁnancial
distress.
The previous empirical studies that are most closely related to our analysis are Nickell and Nicolitsas
(1999) and Benito and Hernando (2008). Both papers provide evidence for a signiﬁcantly
negative relationship between employment and ﬁnancial pressure within single-country ﬁrm-
level panels focusing on the ratio of interest payments to cash ﬂow, the interest burden,
as the key ﬁnancial variable. As Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) point out, interest burden
is a ﬂow measure of ﬁnancial pressure capturing the premium on borrowing costs or the
probability of credit being completely rationed. Finally, they show that the sensitivity of
employment to the interest burden is greater in the case of ﬁxed-term employment contracts
(Benito and Hernando (2008)) and for ﬁrms that are under greater long-term ﬁnancial pres-
sure (Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)).4
More recent studies that examine the ﬁrm-level impact of the ﬁnancial crisis typically
consider the US and ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms were hit the hardest (see e.g.
Campello et al. (2010)).5 Duygan-Bump et al. (2010) ﬁnd that US workers in small ﬁrms
in industries with high external ﬁnancing needs were more likely to become unemployed
during the 2007-2009 crisis. They view these ﬁndings as being supportive of the credit
constraints hypothesis according to which smaller ﬁrms are highly reliant on bank ﬁnancing;
hence, disruptions in the ﬂow of bank lending are expected to have important real economic
4Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) employ three measures of long-term ﬁnancial constraints using a sample of
quoted ﬁrms: size (number of employees), dividend payout relative to assets, and debt to capital ratio. The
ﬁrms are overall fairly large (average number of employees is 4574). High debt ﬁrms exhibit a signiﬁcantly
stronger employment response to the interest burden while the diﬀerence is insigniﬁcant in the case of size
and dividend payout classiﬁcation schemes.
5Campello et al. (2010) use data on ex ante investment decisions based on surveys of CFOs and ﬁnd that
credit availability had strong eﬀects on ﬁrms’ spending plans, with constrained ﬁrms planning deeper cuts
in employment, technology and capital spending.
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eﬀects primarily through smaller ﬁrms. Chodorow-Reich (2014) constructs a data-set that
incorporates information on banking relationships and employment for non-ﬁnancial US ﬁrms
during 2008-2009. His results indicate an important interplay between lender health and
ﬁrm-level employment behaviour as well as a role for ﬁnancial frictions related to asymmetric
information in the lending market. Following the Lehman bankruptcy, small and medium
ﬁrms that had pre-crisis relationships with less healthy lenders experienced a lower likelihood
of obtaining a loan as well as lower employment. Iyer et al. (2014) and Bentolila et al. (2013)
provide similar evidence for Portugal and Spain, respectively.6
3 Empirical speciﬁcations and methodology
3.1 Baseline speciﬁcation
To examine the sensitivity of ﬁrms’ employment decisions to ﬁnancial pressure we estimate
a quadratic adjustment cost employment model that has been augmented to account for
ﬁnancial factors. This model has also been employed by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and
Benito and Hernando (2008).
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2wit 1 + 3wit + 4kit + 5it + 6IBit 1 + it (3.1)
where i = 1,2,. . . , N indexes ﬁrms and t = 1,2,. . . , T indexes years. n is the log of the
number of employees. w is the log of the real wage at the ﬁrm, while w represents its
growth rate. k is the log of the capital stock normalised on the price of investment goods. 
is the growth of real sales, capturing demand shocks.7
The interest burden (IB) is the key explanatory variable for our analysis, accounting
for the role of ﬁnancial pressure on employment. Following Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)
6The ﬁndings of Iyer et al. (2014) suggest that the reduction in credit supply was stronger for smaller ﬁrms,
with weaker banking relationships. These ﬁrms were unable to perfectly substitute credit from crisis-aﬀected
banks with other sources of ﬁnance, such as loans from less aﬀected banks or trade credit. Bentolila et al.
(2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms attached to weaker banks, that were eventually bailed out by the Spanish government,
suﬀered a larger fall in employment.
7See Table A1 in the Appendix for the deﬁnition of the variables in our data-set.
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and Benito and Hernando (2008), this variable is measured as the ratio of interest payments
to cash-ﬂow. There is a large and growing literature that explores the impact of interest
burden on several ﬁrms’ real decisions (see e.g. Benito and Whitley (2003), Spaliara (2009)
and Chen and Guariglia (2009)). It is expected that an increase in ﬁrms’ interest burden
should lead to lower levels of employment.
The error term it comprises a ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant component, encompassing
all time-invariant ﬁrm characteristics likely to inﬂuence employment, as well as the time-
invariant component of the measurement error aﬀecting any of the regression variables; a
time-speciﬁc component accounting for possible business cycle eﬀects; and an idiosyncratic
component. We control for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant component of the error term by
estimating our equation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, and for the time-speciﬁc component by including
time dummies (in addition to the time dummies interacted with industry dummies) in all
our speciﬁcations (see Brown et al. (2009)). We also add country dummies to control for
institutional diﬀerences between countries.
3.2 The eﬀect of the recent ﬁnancial crisis
In order to investigate whether, controlling for other factors, the response of employment to
interest burden is stable across crisis and more tranquil years, we augment Equation (3.1)
with a ﬁnancial crisis dummy (Crisis t), which takes value 1 over the period 2007-2009, and
0 otherwise.
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2wit 1 + 3wit + 4kit + 5it+ (3.2)
+6IBit 1Crisist+7IBit 1(1  Crisist) + it
In the presence of structural change, the eﬀect of interest burden on employment during
crisis (6) and non-crisis years (7) should be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In fact, we would expect
changes in the interest burden to exert a stronger impact on ﬁrms’ employment as we move
on to the crisis period (j6j > j7j).
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3.3 Core versus periphery economies
Next, we explore the extent to which, controlling for the eﬀect of the crisis, changes in debt
serving costs aﬀect ﬁrms’ employment disproportionately in periphery versus non-periphery
euro area economies. We argue that ﬁrms that operate in the periphery group are likely to
be more responsive to the interest burden during the crisis given the tighter credit conditions
and limited access to external ﬁnance that they faced.8 To test this hypothesis, we further
augment the model in equation (3.2) with interactive terms related to the periphery dummy
Peripheryi which is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is operating in periphery economies (Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain) and 0 otherwise.9
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2wit 1 + 3wit + 4kit ++5it + 6IBit 1  Crisist  Peripheryi+
+ 7IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  Peripheryi + 8IBit 1  Crisist  (1  Peripheryi)+
+ 9IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  (1  Peripheryi) + it (3.3)
If the coeﬃcient of the periphery dummy interacted term during the crisis dominates
the corresponding term outside it (j6j > j7j) then an additional response of employment
to interest burden for periphery economies during the crisis is detectable compared to more
tranquil years.
3.4 Financial constraints
Finally, we take into account ﬁrm-level heterogeneity by investigating the role of ﬁnan-
cial constraints in determining ﬁrms’ employment during crisis and non-crisis years. To
do so, we utilise interactions between the interest burden, crisis/tranquil times and con-
strained/unconstrained ﬁrms. Following the established literature on ﬁnancial constraints
and to ensure robustness, we employ three alternative measures of ﬁnancial constraints:
bank dependency, size and the coverage ratio. In keeping with the standard practice in the
literature, we use the median of the distribution of these measures as a cut-oﬀ point to clas-
8The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that ﬁrms in the periphery face a higher interest burden.
9Greece would have been a legitimate candidate for the Periphery group, but due to missing data on
wages it was dropped from the analysis.
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sify ﬁrms into ﬁnancially constrained versus non constrained. The classiﬁcation takes place
each year, hence we allow ﬁrms to transit between classes. The resulting dummy variable
Constrainedit is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is classiﬁed as ﬁnancially constrained within each
industry at year t and 0 otherwise. The econometric model is as follows.
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2wit 1 + 3wit + 4kit ++5it + 6IBit 1  Crisist  Constrainedit+
+ 7IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  Constrainedit + 8IBit 1  Crisist  (1  Constrainedit)+
+ 9IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  (1  Constrainedit) + it (3.4)
This speciﬁcation captures the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the response of employ-
ment to the interest burden during crisis and non-crisis periods. We would expect changes
in the interest burden to exert a stronger impact on employment in the case of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms, especially more so as we move on to the crisis period (j6j > j7j).
3.5 Estimation methodology
All models are estimated in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-invariant ef-
fects. Given the possible endogeneity of our regressors, we use a system Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) approach (Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)).
This estimator combines in a system the relevant equation in ﬁrst diﬀerence and in levels. It
makes use of values of the regressors lagged twice or more as instruments in the diﬀerenced
equation, and of diﬀerences of the regressors lagged once in the levels equation. The system
GMM estimator is preferred to the simple ﬁrst-diﬀerence GMM estimator when instruments
are likely to be weak (Blundell and Bond (1998)).
We employ two diﬀerent criteria to verify whether the model is well speciﬁed. First, we use
the Sargan test (also known as J test), which is a test for overidentifying restrictions. Under
the null of instrument validity, it is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters. Second, we
check for the existence of nth-order serial correlation in the diﬀerenced of the residuals using
the m(n) test, which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of
no serial correlation of the diﬀerenced residuals. We note that the former test is sometimes
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relatively weak in large samples. Speciﬁcally, Blundell et al. (2001) demonstrate using Monte
Carlo experiments that this test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments
for the system GMM, especially for large samples. Chen and Guariglia (2013) conﬁrm this
ﬁnding using a large panel of Chinese ﬁrms.
4 Data
4.1 Data description
The dataset is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the 2012 version of
AMADEUS (Analyse Major Database from European Sources) database, distributed by
Bureau Van Dijk (BvDEP). The database comprises ﬁnancial information on 19 million
public and private ﬁrms across European countries. We cover the time period 2003 through
2011.10 Our data-set spans the following eleven European countries that belong in the euro
area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain. In addition, only ﬁrms with unconsolidated statements are considered
to avoid double counting. As a result, this approach ensures that the majority of the ﬁrms
in the sample are small. In fact, approximately 70% of the ﬁrms which are included in the
data-set are not listed in the stock market.
Following standard selection criteria in the literature, observations with negative sales
and assets are dropped. In order to control for the potential inﬂuence of outliers, observations
in the one percent tail for each of the regression variables are also excluded. In addition,
ﬁrms with less than 3-years of consecutive observations are also dropped from the sample.11
By allowing for entry and exit of ﬁrms the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates
potential selection and survivorship bias. The ﬁnal panel covers 150,268 ﬁrms (corresponding
10A maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at once. Our data-set was down-
loaded in 2012 allowing us to have information for 9 years, since year 2012 was poorly reported at that
time.
11See Tables A2 and A3 in the on-line appendix for the structure of the panel.
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to 1,048,028 observations) which operate in the manufacturing sector.12
4.2 Descriptive analysis
Tables 1 presents summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for our data-set. Com-
paring columns 2 and 3, we can see that between 2007-2009 average ﬁrm-level employment
declined (see also Figure 1), while wage growth and sales growth also slowed down highlight-
ing the deteriorating economic environment. The statistics in Table 1 indicate signiﬁcant
heterogeneity across periphery and non-periphery ﬁrms. Firms operating in the periphery
of the euro area face a higher and more volatile interest burden and have less employees as
compared to ﬁrms in non-periphery countries (columns 5 and 6). Figure 2 plots the average
interest burden for periphery and non-periphery ﬁrms and indicates that the positive gap
between the former and the latter expanded during the ﬁnancial crisis. Finally, Figure 3
shows that SMEs were exposed to signiﬁcantly higher ﬁnancial pressure during the ﬁnancial
crisis with the interest rate burden peaking in 2008.
5 Results
5.1 Interest burden and the role of the crisis
This section investigates the role of interest burden in the level of employment, taking into
account the most recent global ﬁnancial crisis. Table 2 shows the estimation results for
equations (3.1) and (3.2). From column 1 it is clear that the interest burden (IB) exerts
a negative and highly signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrms’ level of employment. The ﬁnding is not
statistically but also economically important. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of - 0.120 implies
an elasticity of employment with respect to interest burden, evaluated at sample means of
12Following Blundell et al. (1992) and based on a two-digital NACE classiﬁcation, ﬁrms are allocated
according to one of the following nine industrial sectors: metal and metal goods; other minerals and mineral
products; chemical and man made ﬁbres; mechanical engineering; electrical and instrument engineering;
Moto vehicles and parts; other transport equipment; food, drink tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather and
footwear; and others.
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-0.035. A 10 percent increase of interest burden reduces the level of employment by 0.35
percent. These ﬁndings suggest that among euro area ﬁrms there are signiﬁcant eﬀects from
ﬁnancial factors on employment consistent with the interpretation of Benito and Hernando
(2008) that ﬁnancing constraints aﬀect labour demand.
Turning to the coeﬃcients on the control variables we note that they have the expected
signs. Speciﬁcally, w and w have a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ em-
ployment. On the other hand,  and k have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect. These ﬁndings
are consistent with previous work by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and Hernando
(2008), notes these eﬀects using panels of UK and Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms, respectively.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the interactions between interest burden and the crisis
terms in order to explore to what extent the diﬀerential impact of the 2007-2009 crisis aﬀects
the level of employment of European ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient of interest burden is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant only for the crisis period. In other words, the results reinforce
the idea that during the crisis, ﬁnancial pressure is more important in determining ﬁrms’
employment. When comparing the role of the interest burden during and outside of the
crisis, employment is more sensitive to the changes of ﬁrms’ servicing debt during the former
period. The economic impact across the two periods is clear: a 10 percent change of interest
burden aﬀects the level of employment by only 0.08 percent during the tranquil period and
by 0.32 percent during the turmoil period. The p-values for the diﬀerences between the two
coeﬃcients indicate that they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. Finally, regarding
the control variables, we ﬁnd that they have the expected signs and are highly important
determinants of ﬁrms’ employment.
The diagnostic tests do not generally indicate signiﬁcant problems with the choice of our
instruments and the speciﬁcation of our model.13
13As we explain in sub-section (3.5), the Sargan test tends to over-reject the null in the case of large
samples. Conﬁrming this, when we perform regressions on a selected country-by-country basis (results
available upon request) we get larger p-values for the Sargan test.
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5.2 Core versus periphery economies during the crisis
Our estimates thus far document the diﬀerential role of interest burden in determining ﬁrms’
employment decisions during crisis and non-crisis periods. In this sub-section we are able
to assess whether the characterisation of core/periphery is an important dimension in the
determination of ﬁrms’ employment, particularly during extreme economic events.
In Table 3 we present the estimates of equation (3.3). The results show that there is a sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent response of ﬁrms’ employment to interest burden during the crisis period
with respect to periphery economies. In particular, when the interest burden is interacted
with the periphery dummy we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for the crisis period, while the interac-
tion between periphery and tranquil times is insigniﬁcant and quantitatively unimportant.
Put diﬀerently, this ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrms in the periphery group react diﬀerently to
debt-servicing costs during cyclical ﬂuctuations. This is a novel result which documents the
impact of the interest burden on ﬁrms’ employment during the recent global ﬁnancial crisis.
To ascertain the economic importance, a 10 percent rise in the interest burden decreases
ﬁrms’ workforce by only 0.07 percent during non-crisis times and by 0.28 percent during the
crisis period. The p-values for the equality of the coeﬃcients show a statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two point estimates.
Turning to the remaining interaction terms, the interest burden does not seem to exert
any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the core ﬁrms during both tranquil and turmoil periods. The p-
value reveals that the coeﬃcients are not statistically diﬀerent from each other. Finally,
when comparing the interactions of the interest burden between the crisis period for core
and periphery groups, we ﬁnd, as expected that the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly higher for
the latter group. This ﬁnding lends support to the story that ﬁrms’ levels of employment in
the periphery group are aﬀected signiﬁcantly more during the ﬁnancial crisis.
With reference to the remaining control variables, we ﬁnd that they remain highly sig-
niﬁcant and behave as conjectured. Moreover, the Sargan and m3 tests do not indicate any
problems with the speciﬁcation of the model and the choice of the instruments.
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5.3 The role of ﬁnancial constraints
We now explore the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the response of employment to interest
burden during crisis and tranquil times for both core and periphery economies, as shown in
Equation (3.4). Therefore, comparing across columns in Table 4 allows us to investigate the
speciﬁc inﬂuence of each measure of being constrained (based on the bank dependency, size
and the coverage ratio) on each of the interactions in the rows.
To begin with the interactions between the interest burden and ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms, we observe that the point estimates are negative and highly signiﬁcant during the
crisis period. This ﬁnding suggests that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, for whom access to
external ﬁnance is limited or prohibitively expensive, are more responsive to changes in the
debt servicing costs during adverse economic events. In addition, this new result extends
the ﬁnding of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) that the borrowing ratio is more important in
determining employment decisions for ﬁrms with high debt compared to ﬁrms with lower
debt levels.
Turning our attention to the interactions of interest burden for unconstrained ﬁrms, we
ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcantly diﬀerence response. Hence, for unconstrained ﬁrms an
increase in debt serving costs has no impact on employment compared to constrained ﬁrms,
whose employment is signiﬁcantly more responsive during the crisis period.
As a ﬁnal test we consider the role of ﬁnancial constraints in ﬁrms’ employment decisions
distinguishing core and periphery economies. The results in Table 5 encapsulate an important
ﬁnding regrading the impact of ﬁnancial constraints. We ﬁnd that the diﬀerential response of
interest burden is stronger for constrained ﬁrms in the periphery area compared to the same
group of ﬁrms in the core European economies. As for unconstrained ﬁrms, these remain
largely unaﬀected irrespective of the location.
To summarise, our results show that it is the constrained ﬁrms, by any deﬁnition we
used, that show greater sensitivity to the interest burden, especially during the recent global
ﬁnancial crisis. Several authors found that capital market imperfections are important in
13
inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ real activities such as investment, inventory, employment and ﬁrm sur-
vival (Guariglia (2008), Carpenter and Guariglia (2008), Guariglia and Mateut (2010) and
Tsoukas (2011)). We ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ employment is more sensitive to changes in the debt
servicing costs for constrained ﬁrms during the crisis than for unconstrained ﬁrms. This
is a new result that complements the earlier work by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and
Benito and Hernando (2008) and highlights the role of capital market imperfections in sev-
eral European economies during the crisis period. In addition, the greater sensitivity for
constrained ﬁrms may result from the greater information asymmetries in the periphery
economies compared to their core counterparts.
5.4 Diﬀerentiating between SMEs and non-SMEs
Finally, we estimate an alternative model to check the diﬀerential response of SMEs.14 A pri-
ori it is expected that changes in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial conditions can make SMEs more vulnerable
during the crisis, since they are associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry
and generally face higher costs of borrowing (Darvas (2013)). In order to investigate this
hypothesis, we re-estimate Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) splitting our ﬁrms into SMEs
and non-SMEs. Following the deﬁnition by the European Commission, SMEs are deﬁned as
those ﬁrms with less than 250 employees and a total revenue equal or less than e50 million.
Results are reported in Tables 6 and 7.
Starting with Table 6, we observe that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate exerts a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on SMEs’ employment decisions during the crisis. On the other hand,
interest burden is statistically insigniﬁcant for their larger counterparts during and outside of
the crisis. These results conﬁrm that during the crisis SMEs are more responsive to changes
in the debt servicing costs on employment.
In Table 7, we take into account the periphery/core distinction. Similar patterns are
observed for SMEs in the euro area periphery. In other words, ﬁnancial pressure has a
14See Table A4 in the on-line appendix for the distribution of SMEs within our sample.
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negative eﬀect on periphery SMEs during the turmoil period. The impact of interest burden
on employment decisions is statistically insigniﬁcant for larger ﬁrms (periphery or not).
This is in line with our expectations and conﬁrms evidence presented by other studies (see
Artola and Genre (2011) and Iyer et al. (2014)).
6 Robustness tests
A series of robustness tests were conducted for the results presented in the previous Section.
The results of these checks, which are not reported in the interest of space, are summarised
below and can be found in the on-line Appendix.
6.1 Additional control variables
To begin with, we examine whether our main results remain unchanged when we employ
an additional set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc macroeconomic variables to control
for ﬁrms’ overall balance sheet position and aggregate pressure, respectively. Our results
conﬁrm that this modiﬁcation did not alter our ﬁndings. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
interest burden remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant determinant of employment
during the crisis. Balance sheet variables (with the exception of liquidity) have no impact on
ﬁrms’ employment decisions, whereas the 10-year government bond yield and the national
unemployment rate have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
employment. To sum up, we show that the link between employment and ﬁnancial pressure
is robust to adding a number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic control variables.
6.2 Alternative deﬁnitions of the crisis dummy
Thus far, we used years 2007-2009 to deﬁne the crisis period. As a robustness check, we re-
estimate Equation (3.2) using a narrower deﬁnition of the crisis period, with the crisis dummy
taking the value 1 during 2008-2009, and 0 otherwise. We ﬁnd that the interest burden’s
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eﬀect on employment during the crisis remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant. As a
ﬁnal check, we take into account two diﬀerent phases of the crisis related to the earlier credit
crisis and the later debt crisis. Thus, we deﬁne two crisis period dummies: Creditt and Debtt
taking the value 1 over the period of 2008-2009 and 2010-2011, respectively and 0 otherwise.
We ﬁnd that employment in periphery-based ﬁrms is more sensitive to changes in the interest
burden during both the credit and debt crisis periods, than outside them. In sum, we can
conclude that the results remain robust to altering the dating of the crisis period.
6.3 Alternative deﬁnition of interest burden
Next, we employ a diﬀerent deﬁnition of interest burden, the ratio of interest payments to
total debt (implicit interest rate) based on work by Benito and Whitley (2003). In doing so,
we take a three year moving average of the total debt data, centred on the current year and
use this as the relevant denominator. We ﬁnd that during the crisis, the eﬀect of the implicit
interest rate on employment is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, our results are
robust to using an alternative measure of the interest burden.
6.4 Alternative cut-oﬀ points for ﬁnancial constraints’ classiﬁcation
In our baseline results, we used a 50% cut-oﬀ point to classify ﬁrms into constrained and
unconstrained. To ensure that our results are not driven by this classiﬁcation scheme, we
employ a diﬀerent cut-oﬀ point. Speciﬁcally, we classify as ﬁnancially constrained the ﬁrms
that exhibit bank dependency (size, coverage) at the top (bottom) 75% of the distribution of
all ﬁrms. Our results indicate that the impact of interest burden on employment is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant only for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms operating in the periphery
during the crisis. Thus, our ﬁndings are robust to the use of an alternative cut-oﬀ point for
ﬁnancial constraint’s classiﬁcation.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of ﬁnancial pressure on employment using a ﬁrm-level
panel data-set for the euro area. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative impact of ﬁnancial pressure
on employment. This eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms in the periphery of the euro area during
the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Within the periphery group, we ﬁnd that the sensitivity of
employment to ﬁnancial pressure is stronger for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms and SMEs.
Our results are robust to a comprehensive sensitivity check. Our ﬁndings have important
policy implications. They suggest that policy initiatives aimed towards enhancing credit
availability and relaxing the ﬁnancial constraints that smaller ﬁrms in the periphery face,
are essential to support the economic recovery of the euro area.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Full sample Non-crisis Crisis Diﬀ. Non-periphery Periphery Diﬀ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
n (Employment) 3.24 3.26 3.22 0.000 3.47 3.10 0.000
(1.07) (1.06) (1.09) (1.14) (1.00)
IB (Interest Burden) 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.000 0.16 0.37 0.000
(0.68) (0.65) (0.74) (0.49) (0.76)
w (Wage Growth) 0.02 0.03 2.4-3 0.000 0.01 0.02 0.000
(0.20) (0.19) (0.205) (0.17) (0.21)
 (Sales Growth) 0.05 0.06 0.027 0.000 0.04 0.05 0.000
(0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26)
w (Wage) 3.48 3.48 3.48 0.073 3.68 3.37 0.000
(0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.30) (0.39)
k (Capital Stock) 6.32 6.30 6.35 0.000 6.03 6.57 0.000
(1.62) (1.61) (1.64) (1.65) (1.55)
Observations 434,261 233,156 201,105 147,628 286,633
Notes: The numbers in this Table are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Crisis period is 2007–09. Periphery
refers to ﬁrms operating in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Diﬀ. is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of means
between crisis and non-crisis periods (column 4), and periphery and non-periphery economies (column 7). See Table A1 in the
Appendix for the deﬁnition of the variables.
Table 2: Employment, ﬁnancial pressure and the crisis
Baseline Crisis
(1) (2)
nit 1 0.986*** 0.965***
(106.78) (94.81)
IBit 1 -0.120**
(-2.23)
IBit 1Crisist -0.204***
(-2.83)
IBit 1(1-Crisist) -0.058
(-0.78)
wit -1.342*** -0.869***
(-10.56) (-4.72)
it 0.799*** 0.832***
(9.45) (9.02)
wit 1 -0.101** -0.088*
(-2.38) (-1.76)
kit 0.017*** 0.020***
(2.86) (2.81)
Observations 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.020 0.001
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.692 0.220
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.004
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **,
and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Periphery, non-periphery and the crisis
nit 1 1.008***
(54.97)
IBit 1CrisistPeripheryi -0.209***
(-3.31)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)Peripheryi -0.061
(-0.83)
IBit 1Crisist(1-Peripheryi) 0.260
(1.00)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)(1-Peripheryi) 0.139
(0.55)
wit -1.390***
(-7.86)
it 0.952***
(8.09)
wit 1 -0.175***
(-3.84)
kit 0.015**
(2.02)
Observations 399,948
Firms 94,356
Sargan (p-value) 0.135
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.517
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis periph. vs. non-crisis periph. 0.035
IB crisis non-periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.443
IB non-crisis periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.480
IB crisis periph. vs. crisis non-periph. 0.062
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **,
and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Financing constraints and the crisis
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
BankDep Size Coverage
(1) (2) (3)
nit 1 1.031*** 0.958*** 0.963***
(62.29) (51.69) (78.00)
IBit 1CrisistConstrainedit -0.146*** -0.221*** -0.235***
(-2.73) (-3.40) (-3.04)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)Constrainedit -0.088 -0.126** -0.208***
(-1.44) (-2.31) (-3.17)
IBit 1Crisist(1-Constrainedit) 0.020 -0.009 0.594
(1.07) (-0.16) (1.61)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)(1-Constrainedit) 0.004 0.010 -0.113
(0.17) (0.34) (-0.51)
wit -1.282*** -1.011*** -1.007***
(-9.77) (-9.08) (-7.27)
it 0.687*** 0.585*** 0.948***
(7.13) (5.34) (8.83)
wit 1 -0.339*** -0.110*** -0.141***
(-3.43) (-4.29) (-3.34)
kit 0.007 0.007 0.024***
(0.78) (1.48) (3.50)
Observations 399,948 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.025 0.001 0.001
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.936 0.719 0.225
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis constr. vs. non-crisis constr. 0.085 0.010 0.656
IB crisis non-constr. vs. non-crisis non-constr. 0.366 0.704 0.113
IB non-crisis constr. vs. non-crisis non-constr. 0.205 0.037 0.671
IB crisis constr. vs. crisis non-constr. 0.008 0.003 0.041
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **,
and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Baseline and crisis models for SMEs and non-SMEs
SMEs Non-SMEs
Baseline Crisis Baseline Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nit 1 0.973*** 0.979*** 0.997*** 1.051***
(89.84) (88.21) (32.58) (15.48)
IBit 1 -0.241*** -0.039
(-3.29) (-0.65)
IBit 1Crisist -0.199*** -0.128
(-3.29) (-1.08)
IBit 1(1-Crisist) -0.047* 0.036
(-1.66) (0.51)
wit -1.449*** -1.115*** -0.470* -0.567*
(-9.87) (-8.41) (-1.76) (-1.88)
it 0.797*** 0.563*** 0.163 0.143
(7.73) (3.78) (1.50) (1.06)
wit 1 -0.168*** -0.093*** -0.061 -0.136
(-3.04) (-2.73) (-0.39) (-0.85)
kit 0.027*** 0.011** 0.018 8.9-5
(3.50) (2.07) (1.10) (0.00)
Observations 376,959 376,959 22,989 22,989
Firms 88,872 88,872 8,060 8,060
Sargan (p-value) 0.412 0.065 0.614 0.726
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.788 0.150 0.401 0.252
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.001 0.263
 
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are ﬁrms that have less than 250 employees and a total revenue equal or less than e50 million.
*, **, and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Periphery, non-periphery, SMEs and non-SMEs
SMEs Non-SMEs
(1) (2)
nit 1 1.021*** 1.007***
(44.27) (18.22)
IBit 1CrisistPeripheryi -0.159** 0.024
(-2.08) (0.23)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)Peripheryi -0.049 -0.025
(-0.98) (-0.15)
IBit 1Crisist(1-Peripheryi) 0.343 -0.012
(1.17) (-0.16)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)(1-Peripheryi) 0.208 0.027
(1.33) (0.49)
wit -1.378*** -0.520**
(-6.13) (-2.08)
it 0.814*** 0.110
(4.75) (0.89)
wit 1 -0.100* -0.026
(-1.90) (0.27)
kit -0.015 0.013
(-0.93) (0.58)
Observations 376,959 22,989
Firms 88,872 8,060
Sargan (p-value) 0.510 0.124
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.558 0.439
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis periph. vs. non-crisis periph. 0.042 0.719
IB crisis non-periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.467 0.610
IB non-crisis periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.166 0.748
IB crisis periph. vs. crisis non-periph. 0.095 0.769
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are ﬁrms that have less than 250 employees and a total revenue equal or less than e50 million.
*, **, and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 1: This ﬁgure presents the average log employment over the period 2003-2011 across
a sample of euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
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Figure 2: This ﬁgure presents average ﬁrm-level interest burden (ratio of interest payments
to cash ﬂow) over the period 2003-2011 across a sample of euro area countries, separating
periphery (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) from non-periphery economies (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands).
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Figure 3: This ﬁgure presents average interest burden (ratio of interest payments to cash
ﬂow) over the period 2003-2011 across SMEs and non-SMEs.
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Online appendix:
On the real eﬀects of ﬁnancial pressure: Evidence from euro area ﬁrm-level
employment during the recent ﬁnancial crisis
Figure A1: This ﬁgure presents resident monetary and ﬁnancial institutions average lending
rates for non-ﬁnancial corporations over the period 2003-2011 across a sample of euro area
countries, separating periphery (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) from non-periphery
economies (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands).
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A2: Structure of the unbalanced panel
Number of obs. per ﬁrm Number of observations Percent Cumulative
3 22,170 2.12 2.12
4 35,792 3.41 5.53
5 84,650 8.08 13.61
6 135,792 12.96 26.56
7 155,232 14.81 41.37
8 283,784 27.08 68.45
9 330,714 31.55 100.00
Total 1,048,134 100.00
Year Number of observations Percent Cumulative
2003 82,740 7.89 7.89
2004 96,115 9.17 17.06
2005 114,864 10.96 28.02
2006 130,683 12.47 40.49
2007 136,128 12.99 53.48
2008 139,869 13.34 66.82
2009 140,154 13.37 80.20
2010 135,769 12.95 93.15
2011 71,812 6.85 100.00
Total 1,048,134 100.00
A
3:
St
ru
ct
ur
e
of
th
e
un
ba
la
nc
ed
pa
ne
lb
y
co
un
tr
y
N
um
be
r
of
ob
s.
pe
r
ﬁr
m
A
us
tr
ia
B
el
gi
um
F
in
la
nd
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
Ir
el
an
d
It
al
y
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
P
or
tu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
3
63
0
36
0
41
7
2,
35
8
6,
54
0
78
7,
96
5
12
71
7
90
6
2,
18
7
4
1,
44
0
44
4
59
6
3,
62
0
11
,5
68
14
4
12
,0
16
44
1,
10
0
1,
32
4
3,
49
6
5
4,
06
5
60
5
75
0
5,
12
5
48
,4
05
15
5
15
,6
35
14
0
1,
66
5
2,
07
0
6,
03
5
6
6,
66
6
84
0
94
2
8,
96
4
73
,9
56
43
2
24
,1
26
13
8
2,
64
6
3,
85
2
13
,2
30
7
6,
69
2
1,
49
8
1,
68
0
20
,0
55
33
,3
90
1,
15
5
49
,2
31
16
8
4,
78
1
9,
41
5
27
,1
67
8
1,
80
0
6,
77
6
3,
83
2
40
,5
68
20
,3
28
2,
84
0
10
8,
69
6
48
0
15
,2
08
7,
20
8
76
,0
48
9
13
5
21
,6
90
11
,8
53
96
,3
27
6,
36
3
1,
33
2
14
4,
01
8
9
13
,3
74
15
,0
66
20
,5
47
T
ot
al
21
,4
28
32
,2
13
20
,0
70
17
7,
01
7
20
0,
55
0
6,
13
6
36
1,
68
7
99
1
39
,4
91
39
,8
41
14
8,
71
0
Y
ea
r
A
us
tr
ia
B
el
gi
um
F
in
la
nd
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
Ir
el
an
d
It
al
y
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
P
or
tu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
20
03
15
2
3,
41
2
1,
82
9
18
,2
65
4,
07
4
70
1
30
,3
91
93
3,
97
1
2,
87
3
16
,9
79
20
04
1,
62
3
3,
47
8
1,
95
0
18
,8
87
6,
85
0
73
3
37
,8
44
94
4,
17
1
3,
05
6
17
,4
29
20
05
1,
88
1
3,
55
4
2,
05
0
19
,4
83
19
,8
22
76
3
39
,7
44
10
7
4,
46
4
5,
02
7
17
,9
69
20
06
2,
97
2
3,
64
3
2,
14
1
20
,0
91
31
,2
24
77
3
41
,6
78
13
6
4,
68
1
4,
75
8
18
,5
86
20
07
3,
32
7
3,
70
1
2,
32
3
20
,6
70
32
,2
25
78
5
44
,3
80
13
9
4,
90
8
4,
90
2
18
,7
68
20
08
3,
45
4
3,
74
9
2,
44
5
21
,1
28
33
,9
44
79
0
45
,2
54
14
6
5,
04
6
4,
99
1
18
,9
22
20
09
3,
33
3
3,
77
9
2,
51
5
21
,1
61
33
,4
00
76
2
46
,2
17
14
0
5,
04
6
4,
94
7
18
,8
54
20
10
3,
39
1
3,
75
4
2,
49
3
20
,2
95
32
,1
22
62
6
45
,5
42
13
0
4,
84
8
4,
90
9
17
,6
59
20
11
1,
29
5
3,
14
3
2,
32
4
17
,0
37
6,
88
9
20
3
30
,6
37
6
2,
35
6
4,
37
8
3,
54
4
T
ot
al
21
,4
28
32
,2
13
20
,0
70
17
7,
01
7
20
0,
55
0
6,
13
6
36
1,
68
7
99
1
39
,4
91
39
,8
41
14
8,
71
0
2
Table A4: Proportion of SMEs by country
Number of ﬁrms Proportion(total) Number of SMEs Proportion of SMEs
Austria 3,690 0.02 698 0.19
Belgium 3,963 0.03 1,625 0.41
Finland 2,631 0.02 2,132 0.81
France 22,849 0.15 22,279 0.98
Germany 35,097 0.23 2,583 0.07
Ireland 833 0.01 21 0.03
Italy 49,429 0.33 30,765 0.62
Luxembourg 151 1:0  3 2 0.01
Netherlands 5,358 0.04 365 0.07
Portugal 5,609 0.04 625 0.11
Spain 20,685 0.14 17,780 0.86
Total 150,295 1 78,875 0.52
Notes: Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are ﬁrms that have less than 250 employees and a total revenue equal or
less than e50 million. The sample period is 2003-2011.
Table A5: Baseline model with additional control variables
Cﬂow Liq Netdebt Bondy Unem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
nit 1 0.975*** 0.971*** 0.975*** 0.981*** 0.945***
(84.50) (93.74) (84.76) (110.49) (64.70)
IBit 1 -0.074* -0.129*** -0.086* -0.109** -0.151*
(-1.80) (-2.89) (-1.66) (-2.37) (-1.79)
Cﬂowit 1 0.001
(0.06)
Liqit 1 0.012*
(1.74)
Netdebtit 1 -2.162
(-1.03)
Bondyt 1 -0.711**
(-2.37)
Unemt -0.516***
(-6.23)
wit -1.052*** -1.167*** -1.110*** -1.211*** -1.305***
(-9.91) (-10.50) (-7.02) (-11.65) (-7.24)
it 0.722*** 0.710*** 0.742*** 0.688*** 0.748***
(9.77) (8.68) (8.00) (7.42) (5.27)
wit 1 -0.090*** -0.162*** -0.115** -0.114*** -0.135***
(-3.03) (-4.31) (-2.57) (-3.10) (-2.73)
kit 0.016** 0.033*** 0.001 0.021*** 0.031***
(2.37) (3.92) (0.06) (3.47) (3.54)
Observations 372,109 367,345 305,761 373,651 373,651
Firms 90,786 90,631 81,461 91,037 91,037
Sargan (p-value) 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.029 0.950
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.338 0.660 0.146 0.388 0.413
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically
robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. Instruments
include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument
validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the
null of no serial correlation. Cﬂow is deﬁned as the ratio of cash-ﬂow to capital stock. Liq is measured as cash and equivalents normalised on
capital stock. Ndebt is deﬁned as liabilities plus long term debt normalised on capital stock minus cash and equivalent divided by capital stock.
Bondl is the 10 year sovereign bond yield of the country. Unem is the annual average unemployment rate of the country. *, **, and ** indicate
3
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively.
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Table A6: Crisis model with additional control variables
Cﬂow Liq Ndebt Bondy Unem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
nit 1 0.964*** 0.955*** 0.988*** 0.968*** 0.973***
(79.01) (71.50) (74.65) (86.27) (114.69)
IBit 1Crisist -0.126*** -0.157*** -0.156* -0.178*** -0.101***
(-2.81) (-3.54) (-1.70) (-3.67) (-2.32)
IBit 1(1- Crisist) -0.031 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 0.037
(-1.21) (-1.11) (-0.79) (-1.35) (0.88)
Cﬂowit 1Crisist 0.012
(0.29)
Cﬂowit 1(1- Crisist) 0.027
(0.86)
Liqit 1Crisist 0.016
(1.23)
Liqit 1(1- Crisist) 0.016
(1.32)
Ndebtit 1Crisist 1.789
(1.50)
Ndebtit 1(1- Crisist) 0.870
(1.08)
Bondyjt 1Crisist 3.000
(1.36)
Bondyt 1(1-Crisist) 0.286
(1.00)
UnemtCrisist -0.272***
(-4.72)
Unemt(1-Crisist) -0.466***
(-3.74)
wit -1.061*** -1.086*** -1.075*** -1.095*** -0.983***
(-9.86) (-9.61) (-4.89) (-8.95) (-8.84)
it 0.570*** 0.651*** -0.820*** 1.047*** 0.813***
(5.26) (6.45) (5.80) (11.38) (16.54)
wit 1 -0.103*** -0.123*** -0.116** -0.075*** -0.071**
(-3.65) (-3.81) (-2.16) (-2.85) (-2.32)
kit 0.028*** 0.040*** 0.022* 0.016*** 0.018***
(3.24) (3.58) (1.84) (3.02) (3.71)
Observations 372,109 367,345 305,761 373,651 373,651
Firms 90,786 90,631 81,461 91,037 91,037
Sargan 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.000
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.758 0.608 0.580 0.975 0.989
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.009 0.001 0.066 0.001 0.000
Cﬂow crisis vs. non-crisis 0.352
Liq crisis vs. non-crisis 0.939
Ndebt crisis vs. non-crisis 0.149
Bondy crisis vs. non-crisis 0.226
Unem crisis vs. non-crisis 0.041
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **,
and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively.
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Table A7: Crisis model with alternative deﬁnition of crisis period
nit 1 0.976***
(106.48)
IBit 1Crisisnt -0.139*
(-1.79)
IBit 1(1-Crisisnt ) -0.038
(-0.48)
wit -1.111***
(-8.89)
it 0.841***
(9.13)
wit 1 -0.034
(-0.59)
kit 0.016**
(2.16)
Observations 399,948
Firms 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.001
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.793
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.041
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Crisisnt
is a dummy variable equal to 1 over the period 2008-2009, and 0 otherwise. *, **, and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the
10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively.
6
Table A8: The two phases of the crisis
nit 1 0.995***
(54.71)
IBit 1*Debtt*Peripheryi -0.221**
(-2.55)
IBit 1*Creditt*Peripheryi -0.139**
(-2.48)
IBit 1*Debtt*(1-Peripheryi) 0.416
(1.38)
IBit 1*Creditt*(1-Peripheryi) 0.352
(1.31)
IBit 1*(1-Debtt-Creditt)*Peripheryi -0.210
(-1.30)
IBit 1*(1-Debtt-Creditt)*(1-Peripheryi) 0.488
(1.36)
wit -1.374***
(-7.70)
it 0.913***
(5.87)
wit 1 -0.150**
(-2.49)
kit 0.015
(1.47)
Observations 399,948
Firms 94,395
Sargan 0.009
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.573
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB debt crisis periph. vs. credit crisis periph. 0.031
IB debt crisis non-periph. vs. credit crisis non-periph. 0.654
IB credit crisis periph. vs. credit crisis non-periph. 0.076
IB debt crisis periph. vs. debt crisis non-periph. 0.049
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Creditt
and Debtt indicate dummy variables representing the two phases of the ﬁnancial crisis. The former takes the value of 1 in the
years 2008-2009 and 0 otherwise. The latter takes the value of 1 in the years 2010-2011 and 0 otherwise. *, **, and ** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively.
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Table A9: Alternative deﬁnition of interest burden
Baseline Crisis
(1) (2)
nit 1 1.002*** 0.981***
(75.74) (76.01)
IBdit 1 -0.047*
(-1.85)
IBdit 1Crisist -0.061**
(-2.44)
IBdit 1(1-Crisist) -0.011
(-0.41)
wit -0.834*** -0.791***
(-4.94) (-4.85)
it 0.318 0.162
(1.29) (0.72)
wit 1 -0.031 -0.014
(-0.96) (-0.46)
kit -0.008 -0.004
(-1.07) (0.52)
Observations 363,932 363,932
Firms 86,636 86,636
Sargan (p-value) 0.374 0.129
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.656 0.399
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.021
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. IBdit
is the ratio of interest payments to 3-year moving average of total debt. *, **, and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10
%, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively.
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Table A10: Alternative classiﬁcation for ﬁnancing constraints
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
BankDep Size Coverage
(1) (2) (3)
nit 1 1.033*** 0.962*** 0.913***
(52.71) (55.33) (7.09)
IBit 1CrisistConstrainedit -0.151*** -0.165*** -0.455**
(-2.67) (-3.07) (-2.25)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)Constrainedit 0.023 -0.085** -0.170
(0.31) (-2.24) (-0.81)
IBit 1Crisist(1-Constrainedit) 0.180 0.030 1.014
(0.97) (0.37) (1.57)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)(1-Constrainedit) 0.224 0.031 0.398
(1.15) (0.79) (0.40)
wit -1.111*** -1.008*** -1.331***
(-6.90) (-8.00) (-4.11)
it 0.698*** 0.576*** 1.420***
(5.51) (4.66) (4.06)
wit 1 -0.113 -0.119*** -0.180
(-1.60) (-4.40) (-1.06)
kit 0.010 0.009* 0.085
(0.98) (1.79) (0.69)
Observations 399,948 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.014 0.003 0.876
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.841 0.924 0.083
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis constr. vs. non-crisis constr. 0.017 0.027 0.045
IB crisis non-constr. vs. non-crisis non-constr. 0.531 0.989 0.531
IB non-crisis constr. vs. non-crisis non-constr. 0.339 0.050 0.619
IB crisis constr. vs. crisis non-constr. 0.069 0.012 0.060
Notes: All speciﬁcations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The ﬁgures in parentheses report t-statistics that
are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged two times or more. Sargan is a test of over-identifying restric-
tions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m3) is a test for ﬁrst (third) order serial correlation
in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Financially con-
strained ﬁrms exhibit BankDep (Size, Coverage) at the top (bottom) 75% of the distribution of all ﬁrms operating in the same
industry at a given year. *, **, and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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